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ABSTRACT 
Lay perceptions of risk appear rooted more in heuristics than in reason. A major concern of 
the risk regulation literature is that such “error-strewn” perceptions may be replicated in 
policy, as governments respond to the (mis)fears of the citizenry. This has led many to 
advocate a relatively technocratic approach to regulating risk, characterised by high reliance 
on formal risk and cost-benefit analysis. However, through two studies of chemicals 
regulation, we show that the formal assessment of risk is pervaded by its own set of 
heuristics. These include rules to categorise potential threats, define what constitutes valid 
data, guide causal inference, and to select and apply formal models. Some of these 
heuristics lay claim to theoretical or empirical justifications, others are more back-of-the-
envelope calculations, whilst still more purport not to reflect some truth but simply to 
constrain discretion or perform a desk-clearing function. These heuristics can be understood 
as a way of authenticating or formalising risk assessment as a scientific practice, 
representing a series of rules for bounding problems, collecting data, and interpreting 
evidence (a methodology). Heuristics are indispensible elements of induction. And so they 
are not problematic per se, but they can become so when treated as laws rather than as 
contingent and provisional rules. Pitfalls include the potential for systematic error, masking 
uncertainties, strategic manipulation, and entrenchment. Our central claim is that by 
studying the rules of risk assessment qua rules, we develop a novel representation of the 
methods, conventions, and biases of the prior art. 
Keywords: science-policy, risk-regulation, governance, model evaluation, inference rules. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE FALL OF HOMO ECONOMICUS AND THE RISE OF 
TECHNOCRATIC RISK REGULATION 
“For regulation of the risks associated with particulate matter or acid deposition, it makes no 
sense to consult heuristic-based judgments. The best approach is instead highly quantitative, 
based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of various possible approaches.” (Cass 
Sunstein, 2008) (1)  
A substantial body of research suggests that lay perceptions of risk are rooted more in 
cognitive heuristics than in reason; homo economicus is no longer with us. (2-4) In short, 
when forming judgements under uncertainty people often answer complex, time consuming 
questions (e.g. what is the risk posed by nuclear power?) by substituting them with simpler 
ones (e.g. how do I feel about nuclear power?). Although such heuristics are argued by some 
to be efficient and often accurate tools for dealing with bounded rationality, (e.g. 5) the focus 
of the risk regulation literature has been on the systematic and predictable errors that arise 
from their application. (4, 6-9)  The concern is that such “erroneous” risk perceptions may be 
replicated in law, policy and regulation, as democratic governments respond to the 
(mis)fears of the citizenry. This has catalysed an influential school of thought which 
prescribes a relatively technocratic approach to regulating risk, characterised by a high 
degree of deference to formal risk and cost-benefit analysis in the policy-making process. 
(e.g. 4, 10-13) These methodologies are intended to serve as “institutional safeguards” (8) that 
screen out the malign influence of heuristic-based judgments, and thus help ensure rational 
risk regulation (i.e. utility maximising). In short, the argument is that “even if many heuristics 
mostly work well in daily life, a sensible government can do much better than to rely on 
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them.” (Sunstein, 2002 (4)) This school of thought – and its close cousin the Nudge agenda (14) 
– has intimately shaped policy debates and practices throughout the West.  
Nevertheless, the basic argument has been challenged on a variety of fronts. It has been: 
critiqued as paternalistic or even undemocratic, in that it fails to respect citizen preferences; 
(15) portrayed as placing too much emphasis on the role of heuristics and biases in shaping 
risk perceptions to the neglect of factors such as culture; (16) and accused of downplaying 
the value judgements embedded within technical analysis. Yet the overarching premise – 
that reliance on risk and cost-benefit analysis is a viable means for screening out heuristic 
influences from risk regulation – remains broadly unchallenged. To be sure, several scholars 
(e.g. 17) have emphasised that risk assessors are unlikely to be free of cognitive quirks, yet this 
tu quoque argument rather misses its target. After all, Sunstein and his fellow travellers are 
not suggesting that policy-making should rely on expert perceptions of risk, but on expert 
analyses. For a tu quoque argument to have any force, it must be directed at the 
methodology and practice of formal risk assessment, not at how experts perform in 
psychometric tasks.  
Through two studies of chemicals regulation, this paper takes up that challenge. It shows 
that the technical assessment of risk is structured and pervaded by its own set of heuristics, 
which are used to categorise potential threats, define what constitutes valid data, guide 
causal inference, and select and apply formal models. Some of these heuristics lay claim to 
theoretical or empirical justification, others are more back-of-the-envelope style 
calculations, whilst still more purport not to reflect some truth but simply to constrain 
discretion or perform a sort of desk-clearing function.  The tu quoque critique turns out to 
have some mileage, although in a different direction than initially conceived. Of course, a 
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collective reliance on heuristics does not imply that lay and expert analyses of risk are on 
the same footing, at least if we are to take the idea of expertise at all seriously. Indeed, the 
central theme of the paper is that heuristics are not problematic per se – induction 
necessarily depends on procedures of inference that cannot be fully justified in a formal 
sense (18) – but rather that they have certain structural features that carry significant 
implications for how we think about and design risk assessment processes. 
 We emphasize that the heuristics we identify are rather different in character from the lay 
rules of thumb à la Danny Kahneman, (e.g. 2) which are intuitive, fuzzy (i.e. based on linguistic 
rather than mathematical terms), and domain-general. Our rules have more in common 
with another school of thought on heuristics, which traces its (modern) origins to the work 
of Polya. (19) Polya saw heuristics as provisional methods and principles of discovery that fell 
short of demonstration, yet that were indispensible for domains that did not admit of 
formal logic or proofs. His notion of heuristics heavily influenced the (then) emerging fields 
of artificial intelligence and expert systems, including pioneers such as Simon, (20) Pearl (21) 
and Lenat. (22) In these fields, heuristics are conceived and modelled as one of the 
foundational elements of expert knowledge. They are generally represented as sets of if-
then rules that guide and structure inferences, decisions, and problem-solving in systematic 
ways. Their functions range from interpreting data, to predicting system behaviour, and to 
system control. (23) These sorts of rules are typically domain specific rather than general 
purpose, often represented in formal language rather than linguistic variables, and work by 
leveraging empirical facts or causal relations that are more or less accepted or understood. 
Although they do not guarantee correct solutions or optimal outcomes, they offer useful 
guidance through drawing on incomplete or imperfect knowledge and making problems 
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tractable (e.g. through ignoring information or options). These basic properties – formalism, 
domain-specificity, a focus on induction rather than proof, and explicit justification – 
suggest that this tradition is a useful framework to bring to the analysis of technical or 
expert practices such as formal risk assessment. And so we draw on some of its key insights.  
Our paper’s main contribution is to show that by studying the heuristics of risk assessment 
qua heuristics – that is, by thinking about the particular justifications, functions, and 
problems of rule-based reasoning – we develop important insights on the form, strengths, 
and limits of the prior art. Put another way, it offers a novel representation of the methods, 
conventions, and biases of formal risk assessment, and one that offers practical insights on 
how to improve this crucial process. The body of the paper is split into two parts. Study I 
offers a detailed but largely theoretical analysis of the heuristics that structure the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) risk assessment methodology for industrial 
chemicals. Study II offers a brief empirical proof of concept that such heuristics are applied 
and interpreted in significant and interesting ways across various policy domains, drawing 
on judicial reviews of agency decisions.  
2. STUDY I: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Case Selection and Rationale 
This section of the paper examines the risk assessment of industrial chemicals, focussing on 
the practices of the EPA. The main logic of this choice was that the four-stage chemical risk 
assessment paradigm (Figure 1) – or its close cousins – underpins a range of policy-domains 
(e.g. pharmaceuticals, food additives, hazardous waste site evaluations, microbiological risk 
assessment, etc.), and so the findings would lend themselves to generalisation. The second 
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logic was that the EPA’s practices are relatively transparent and well documented. Thirdly, 
the EPA has pioneered risk assessment across a range of environmental and public health 
domains, and so can be seen as something of a “hard case” from which to build the thesis. 
Broadly speaking, the aim of the research was to uncover and critically evaluate the 
heuristics embedded within the EPA’s approach to chemical risk assessment. The narrow 
goal was to question the claim that a sensible government can do better than rely on rules 
of thumb, although the broader ambition was to develop insights into the practice of risk 
assessment by studying those rules qua rules.  
2.2 Methods and Definitions 
Data was collected from various sources describing, evaluating, and providing context or 
background on the EPA’s practices, including: a) risk assessment statutes, guidelines, 
procedures and outputs; b) critiques and evaluations of those practices from within the 
scientific and policy communities; and c) primary research papers and reviews providing 
detail and background on the relevant theories, methods, and assumptions adopted by the 
agency. The data was then inspected to identify the heuristics embedded within the risk 
assessment process. The heuristics were next grouped into categories according to the 
functions they performed (e.g. causal inference, weighting lines of evidence, etc.). Heuristics 
are defined here as rules of thumb for inference and choice. There are three key elements 
to this definition: heuristics are rule-like, in the sense that there is a presumption in favor of 
following them (i.e. they structure or constrain judgment); they are rules of inference or 
choice (i.e. if-then), not simply assumptions; and finally, they are simple, frugal approaches 
to problem solving which ignore relevant information rather than seeking to optimize. 
Although heuristics are treated rather differently across and even within different 
8 
 
disciplines – in terms of their normative status, where they reside, and whether they are 
implicit or explicit – this definition seems to capture a shared understanding of what they 
are. As we are concerned with the practice of technical risk assessment it should be clear 
that we do not – in contrast to the mainstream risk literature – see heuristics solely as 
intuitive tools residing primarily at the subconscious level. Instead, our focus shall be on 
those heuristics that are socially and scientifically constructed, reside within institutions, 
and are applied deliberatively. 
3. STUDY I: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This section places the heuristics identified within the context of a functional typology, and 
includes discussion of their basic form, origins, and characteristics. 
3.1 Screening and Categorisation Heuristics 
3.1.1. Context and Heuristics 
A basic problem in chemicals regulation is that not all substances of potential regulatory 
interest can be subject to comprehensive risk assessment, and so some approach has to be 
devised to search and prioritise the problem space. And so the EPA adopts a tiered 
approach to evaluation, where the type and degree of scrutiny is matched to the nature and 
extent of the risk that each chemical poses. For new chemicals, this process involves 
categorising substances according to shared properties and characteristics, and matching 
these groups to particular test and assessment requirements. In doing so, the agency draws 
on a range of evidence, such as physico-chemical properties, (expected) production 
volumes, existing toxicity or environmental fate and behaviour studies, etc. The logic is that 
these provide cues as to the degree of risk posed by a particular chemical, and to their 
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expected environmental and biological properties.  Historically, the EPA conducted this 
threat categorisation through what we might be called a factors-based approach.  Here, the 
factors to be considered in making a judgment are pre-defined, perhaps along with the 
relevant sources of evidence, although their relative weights or summing rules are 
constructed on an ad hoc or implicit basis. However, more recently the agency has moved to 
formalise elements of the process into a set of heuristics. Perhaps most significant are the 
set of classification rules (essentially decision trees) found in the agency’s “chemical 
categories program.” (24) Here, if a chemical is deemed to be a member of a broader class 
with shared properties, it is matched to generic hazard concerns, “boundaries” which set 
out any constraints surrounding those concerns, and finally to particular test strategies. One 
of these decision trees is detailed below, followed by two similar categorisation heuristics 
found in other agency programs:  
 If chemicals pass threshold measures of persistence (e.g. greater than 6 months 
transformation half-life) or bioaccumulation (e.g. > 5000 BAF* or BCF) they are 
matched with specific agency actions (e.g. “ban pending testing”) and test strategies 
(e.g. biodegradability tests). 
 Polymers with high molecular weights (> 1,000 daltons), as well as strong mineral 
acids and bases, are categorised as unlikely to be hormonally active and thus 
excluded from test requirements under the endocrine disruptor screening program. 
(25) 
                                                          
*
 BAF is the ratio of a chemical’s concentration in an organism to that in the ambient environment at a steady 
state, whilst BCF is the ratio of a chemical’s concentration in fish to that in water. 
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 If a new chemical meets one of several criteria that suggest significant or substantial 
exposure (e.g. expected production volume of 100,000 kg/yr), then the agency has 
the statutory authority to require certain toxicity tests (e.g. the Ames test). (26)  
3.1.2. Analysis 
These heuristics can be seen as an attempt to codify a body of knowledge and to leverage it 
in a way that reduces the problem space to a more tractable size, and avoids repeat 
enquiries into similar facts. The rules draw on two different sorts of justifications. The first is 
to use the identifying properties of a class to categorise chemicals into groups (e.g. using the 
existence of particular functional groups to classify substances). The second sort involves 
causal knowledge, for example relating to how particular properties of chemicals (e.g. 
functional groups) shape environmental and biological behaviour. Often rules draw on both 
types of justification. For example, the second rule uses the threshold of > 1,000 daltons as 
the identifying property to class a substance as heavy. And it is also based on causal 
assumptions, namely that heavy polymers are unlikely to reach molecular receptors or other 
target tissues, and that highly reactive chemicals (strong mineral acids and bases) will 
destroy tissue at the point of entry leading to toxic effects other than through the endocrine 
system. (25)  On the other hand, these heuristics also emerged under pressure from the 
regulated industry and the courts, who had called for greater predictability, transparency, 
and consistency in the prioritisation process. (26) From this perspective, the rules serve to 
discipline the process and make it explicit. Heuristics, then, can have multiple origins or 
types of justifications: ways of justifying specific rules, and also ways of justifying rules qua 
rules.  
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However, these rules – by virtue of being generalisations – may lead to misclassification in 
certain instances. Consider the first decision tree. Here, the criterion for classifying 
chemicals as “very bioaccumulative” or not (> 5000 BAF or BCF) is based on the logic that 
BCF and BAF are proxies for the potential for a chemical to accumulate within organisms 
and concentrate up the food-chain. Although this generalisation has theoretical and 
empirical verification, it stems from work on lipophilic, non-ionic, organic substances that 
undergo minimal metabolism. (27) For substances that do not share those properties, BCF or 
BAF may not be reliable indicators for bioaccumulation (e.g. chemicals where sorption does 
not depend on hydrophobic interaction). These, then, are the scope conditions under which 
the heuristic is valid, and by explicitly stating them – in apparent contrast to other regimes 
(28) – the EPA guards against misclassification. This cannot, however, skirt the arbitrariness 
inherent in using thresholds to classify chemicals according to interval (rather than 
categorical) variables, a problem compounded by the often substantial uncertainty 
surrounding measurements of these properties. (28) 
3.2. Gatekeeping Heuristics 
3.2.1. Context and Heuristics 
A key challenge of risk assessment is to winnow down the mass of data that might serve as 
inputs to the process, whether relating to a chemical’s toxicological mode of action, the 
form of its dose-response curve, or its environmental fate and behaviour. Two evaluation 
tests are generally applied: is the data relevant, and is it of sufficient quality/validity; our 
focus is on the latter. One approach to this evaluation is to establish rules for excluding 
studies deemed to be wholly inadequate in protocol, conduct, or reporting (i.e., gatekeeping 
rules). For example: 
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  EPA risk assessors are encouraged to exclude toxicity studies whose test protocols 
use either excessively or insufficiently high dose selections, according to specified 
criteria (e.g. if neither toxicity nor weight gain is observed in the test population, 
then the maximum dose is generally considered to have been insufficiently high). (29) 
However, such a rule-like approach to determining technical validity is very much the 
exception at the EPA. This is likely due to the rise of weight-of-evidence approaches in the 
agency’s approach to risk assessment, and the associated principle that even imperfect 
studies might serve as inputs, albeit with appropriately low weights. This brings with it a 
focus on weighting the quality or strength of different lines of evidence, rather than a 
reliance on categorical tests for accepting or rejecting data. However, one long-established 
and highly significant gatekeeping rule resists this Zeitgeist:  
 Toxicity studies funded or conducted by industry are deemed invalid for regulatory 
purposes if they do not adhere to Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) and EPA 
approved test methods (the “GLP heuristic”). (30) 
This heuristic plays a rather more complex function than simply discriminating between 
valid and invalid research, as we see below. 
3.2.2. Analysis 
The GLP heuristic acts to exclude, for the purposes of risk assessment, industry toxicity 
studies that do not conform to the mix of general quality requirements and technical 
prescriptions contained in GLP and the relevant test methods (e.g. covering the care of 
laboratory animals, instrument calibration, test protocols, and the collection and storage of 
raw data). Crucially, the principle is not that studies which do not conform to these 
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requirements are necessarily invalid, as can be seen from the fact that it applies only to 
industry rather than academic research. Indeed the concept of GLP emerged in response to 
sloppy research practices, research misconduct, and even outright fraud on the part of 
private research companies operating free from the checks and balances of academic peer 
review. (31, 32) And so the GLP heuristic was intended as a way of controlling any incentives 
that industry might have to downplay the risks associated with their products, and to serve 
as a surrogate for peer review to ensure a basic level of methodological quality. Yet the rule 
carries with it some unintended consequences. For example, given that the approved test 
methods are subject to detailed validation and interlaboratory reliability studies, they may 
come to represent relatively insensitive and outdated methodologies when compared to 
cutting edge or novel research techniques or protocols. (33) In such instances, the heuristic 
can serve to ensure that industry studies don’t follow state-of-the-art methods, and so 
might impede the resolution of questions that lie at the centre of risk assessment 
controversies. (32) 
Citing concerns about the reproducibility and validity of research conducted via non-
standardized methodologies, some toxicologists (including industry scientists) have implied 
that academic research should be subject to the same GLP heuristic. (33) The explicit claim is 
that only GLP compliant work is sufficiently robust and rigorous to serve as a basis for 
quantitative risk assessment. (e.g. 34)  This has been fiercely resisted by some scientists – on 
the grounds of the high costs of compliance, the fact that academic peer review acts as an 
analogous (or superior) form of quality control, and the concern that it would exclude novel 
experimental designs from consideration in risk assessment. (32) The defence, in short, is that 
such a scope-extension would have little basis in the original justification of the heuristic, 
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and that in some instances, it may represent a strategic effort on the part of industry to 
exclude research that may threaten their commercial interests (i.e. an attempt to game or 
bend the rule). Whatever the merits of this dispute, these efforts at scope-extension appear 
to have found isolated success in other policy domains, with the US Food and Drug 
Administration’s recent evaluation of BPA excluding academic toxicology studies that were 
not GLP-compliant. (32) 
3.3. Causal Inference 
Causal inference is broadly concerned with determining whether an association should be 
treated as causal (i.e. “true”), rather than as non-existent or spurious. It can be classed into 
two categories depending on whether it focuses on the interpretation of a discrete signal, or 
on the weighting and aggregation of multiple lines of evidence.  
3.3.1. Signal vs. Noise 
3.3.1.1. Context and Heuristics 
The need to discriminate between a signal from a target and noise from a distracter 
underlies various elements of chemical risk assessment. For example, is an apparent 
increase in tumour incidence in laboratory animals likely due to exposure to the test 
chemical, or does it represent random variation; and does the response of an analytical 
instrument (i.e. an apparent “detection”) indicate the presence of a substance or rather 
stem from interference? A standard approach to resolving such questions is to focus on the 
statistical properties of the signal. One classic version of this is significance testing, which 
often takes the form of the following heuristic:  
15 
 
 A finding or association is treated as “true” (or chance is rejected as a plausible 
explanation) if it meets a predefined level of statistical significance (typically, a p-
value of 0.05).  
At the EPA, variants of this rule are used to: 
 Determine whether chance, rather than a treatment-related effect, is a plausible 
explanation for an apparent increase in tumour formation (during hazard 
identification); (29) 
 Inform the derivation of the no-observed-adverse-effect-level (NOAEL) in dose-
response analysis (a statistically significant response is sufficient, but not necessary, 
to reject an exposure level as representing the NOAEL); (35) and  
 To discriminate between “true” detections of a chemical substance (analyte) and 
detections that cannot be reliably distinguished from instrument error or noise (i.e. 
the limit of detection). (36) 
3.3.1.2. Analysis 
The statistical significance heuristic is a long-standing and controversial approach to causal 
inference. General critiques of its application within risk assessment have centred on: (37, 38) 
1) The fact that it focuses entirely on statistical considerations to the neglect of other 
relevant factors; 
2) The arbitrariness of (typically) selecting a p-value of 0.05 as the threshold that 
demarcates “true” from “false” associations (i.e. that it is a mere convention); and, 
relatedly 
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3) A perception that a p-value of 0.05 – whilst perhaps justified in “basic” science (given 
the preference for false negatives over false positives) – places too high an 
evidentiary burden on “proving” an effect in a regulatory context (the 
“conservatism” charge). 
In other words, it is not just the content or form of the heuristic that has been seen as 
problematic; instead, it has been criticised as a rule. That is, it has been critiqued as 
neglecting information that often turns out to be crucial, portrayed as being ritualistically 
and uncritically adhered to, and attacked as having been adopted in a context where its 
original justification no longer holds true. These are all general critiques of rules qua rules. 
However, the third element of this critique – the charge of “conservatism” – has limited 
traction where the EPA’s practices are concerned. This is because, for the three variants of 
the rule listed above, a failure to meet the threshold of statistical significance does not 
mean that the finding or association is treated as chance or as noise (which would err on the 
side of under-estimating risk). For example, in exposure assessment, where observed values 
(concentration levels) are deemed to be too low to be reliably distinguished from 
instrument error or noise, they are not treated as zero. Instead, procedures are applied to 
substitute for this “censored” data (e.g. proxy measures are used), to guard against under-
estimation. (36) This is broadly analogous to what Pearl (21) called “recovery schemes” – 
safeguards built into a heuristic’s application designed to ensure that it doesn’t function in 
perverse or undesirable ways. This suggests a fairly subtle appreciation of the biases that 
are intrinsic to rule-based reasoning. Although, as we shall see, this appreciation is 
sometimes lacking. 
3.3.2. Weight of Evidence Heuristics 
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3.3.2.1. Context and Heuristics  
Weight of evidence (WoE) approaches are increasingly prominent at the EPA, following the 
logic that there are often multiple lines of evidence that bear on a particular causal 
inference (e.g. is a chemical a human carcinogen), which need to be weighted and 
aggregated prior to making a final determination. This process may in principle be guided by 
some formal algorithm or set of rules (as proposed in (39)), though in practice typically takes 
the form of factors-based judgments. A classic example is Bradford-Hill’s list of criteria for 
determining whether a chemical causes disease in a given population, variants of which are 
set out across EPA guidelines. Here, the factors to be considered in interpreting evidence 
are pre-defined (e.g. the strength of any epidemiological association, its biological 
plausibility, etc.), yet generally without rules for weighting or summing them. (e.g. 29)  As an 
exception to this rulelessness, the agency has set out heuristics that classify the relative 
strength of different sources of animal and epidemiological evidence: 
 In evaluating whether a chemical is potentially mutagenic, the agency places greater 
weight on tests conducted in germ cells than somatic cells, on in viva rather than in 
vitro tests, on tests in eukaryotes rather than prokaryotes, and on mammalian rather 
than sub-mammalian species. (40)  
 A similar set of rules exists to guide the evaluation of potential endocrine disruptors 
(e.g. in vitro results from assay systems with metabolic capacity outweigh results 
from those without, etc.). (41, 42) 
 In cancer risk assessment, human data is given greater weight than animal data in 
hazard characterization and dose-response assessment (provided it is of high quality and 
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adequate power), and amongst epidemiological studies, greater weight is given to those 
having more specific and precise exposure estimates. (29) 
3.3.2.2. Analysis 
Most of these hierarchies† are based on principle that particular sources of evidence (e.g. 
specific toxicity test systems) generate data of broadly similar accuracy, reliability or 
relevance. For example, mammalian test systems are given greater weight than bacterial 
ones because of major differences in their cells (e.g. membrane structures, DNA repair 
capabilities, etc.), with the former of course being closer analogues to humans. However, 
one blindspot of this approach is that it neglects the question of how well designed, 
conducted, and reported the individual studies were. A second blindspot is that such 
hierarchies don’t accommodate the idea that the specific hypothesis under question might 
alter the strength to be afforded to a particular line of evidence. For example, a particular 
study on a particular test system may rank poorly on existing hierarchies (because the test 
system, in general, has modest sensitivity and specificity), yet nevertheless be best suited to 
resolve a question regarding a chemical’s mode of toxicological action. The point – by now 
perhaps laboured – is that rules are generalisations and thus abstract away from or ignore 
details that may in some contexts prove critical.  It is an open question whether the ceteris 
paribus qualifications that the agency attaches to these heuristics – e.g. “assuming 
appropriate dose and route of exposure” (42) and “provided it is of high quality and adequate 
power” (29) – sufficiently clarify this point. This is not an issue restricted to evidence 
hierarchies. It is the broader problem of clarifying the nature and extent of evidence 
required to depart from heuristics in particular instances. We return to this later. 
                                                          
†
 The latter hierarchy is based on the statistical properties of the study outputs, the idea being that studies 
with high precision (or low variance) are more informative (e.g. typically having larger sample sizes, etc.). 
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3.4. Modelling 
The heuristics discussed so far have dealt with tasks of classification; we now turn to 
heuristics involved in the selection and application of dose-response models, looking at both 
carcinogens and non-carcinogens (Figure 2), and focussing on the use of animal rather than 
epidemiological data. The EPA adopts different modelling approaches for interpolation and 
extrapolation, so we address each separately before providing a joint analysis. 
3.4.1. Interpolation (analysis in the observed range) 
3.4.1.1. Context and Heuristics 
The determination of a (potential) causal link between a chemical and harm is the precursor 
to building formal models of the relationship between dose and response. Interpolation 
involves structuring and regimenting the raw test data into a dose-response curve (typically 
covering moderate-high dose levels), with the purpose of deriving a “point of departure” 
(POD) from which extrapolation to the low-dose range can then be made. (35, 43, 44) This is a 
complex task with numerous possible approaches. For example, which species and endpoint 
should be used as the basis for the dose-response relationship? Should a biological or 
statistical model be used for interpolation? And which parameter estimation technique 
should be used to apply it (e.g. maximum likelihood vs. non-linear least squares)? Or should 
the dose-response data simply be plotted by hand, and formal modelling eschewed (e.g. 
where the NOAEL or LOAEL are taken as the POD)? These are the classic dilemmas of 
modelling-for-policy, where model selection is typically underdetermined by the raw data, 
underlying theories may be contested, and any choice involves a mixture of science and 
policy judgment. Rather than leave these decisions entirely up to the discretion of risk 
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assessment teams, the EPA is famous for having adopted presumptive rules to structure the 
process. (43-45) One such rule, generally perceived to be precautionary, is that: 
 The “critical effect”‡ is the preferred basis for constructing the dose-response model, 
in situations where there are several datasets to choose from (e.g. datasets relating 
to different endpoints, such as carcinogenic vs. neurotoxic, and perhaps of different 
species). (35)  
Moreover, there are simple rules applied to adjust dose-response data prior to model 
construction: 
 The cross-species scaling heuristic for  oral exposure,§ wherein animal doses are 
scaled by ¾ power of body-weight to derive the toxicologically equivalent human 
dose (to account for differences in size and lifespan across species); (46) and  
 A special-form of Haber’s Rule – where identical products of dose concentration and 
exposure time are presumed to lead to equivalent biological responses (C × t = k) – is 
used, where necessary, to adjust from intermittent laboratory exposures to “real 
world” continuous exposure conditions. (47, 48) 
The above two are rules setting out how to adjust the raw dose-response data, and are 
empirically rooted in the sense that they purport to represent relationships that exist in the 
real-world, rather than being justified on policy grounds. They embody truth claims, in other 
words, rather than being mere conventions or value judgments, and these claims can be 
                                                          
‡
 “The first adverse effect, or its known precursor, that occurs to the most sensitive species as the dose rate of 
an agent increases.” 
§
 This applies to carcinogenic risk assessment (Figure 2). For non-carcinogens, cross-species extrapolation is 
achieved through applying an adjustment factor (discussed later), although the EPA has recently moved to 
harmonise the two. Pharmacokinetic modelling is an alternative approach to cross-species scaling, although 
rarely possible in practice. 
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held to account. Accordingly, their empirical bases have been subject to critical scrutiny, (46, 
48) and indeed one long-standing critique of Haber’s Rule is that it has at times been 
interpreted by toxicologists as a causal law, rather than as a statistical approximation 
subject to certain scope conditions. (49)  
We now turn to model selection and implementation, which is largely a curve-fitting 
exercise, in the sense that there is typically little mechanistic basis to the models being 
considered. (50) For model implementation – or parameter estimation – the EPA relies on 
factors-based judgments rather than explicit rules. For example, the factors that may 
influence the selection of parameter estimation techniques are discussed in the more 
technically-oriented guidelines, (e.g. 50) although no default method is established, nor is a 
rule or algorithm established for choosing between them.  For model selection, the EPA 
tends not to rely on default procedures per se.** That is to say that there is typically no 
default model recommended, nor an explicit hierarchy of preferred models, in part because 
different study designs and datasets shape dose-response patterns. (50) But the agency does 
use heuristics to guide the process of model selection. (50) 
 In benchmark dose-response modelling, α = 0.1 is recommended as measure of 
adequate fit, along with a less formal “eyeballing” test.  
 Should multiple models pass the above tests, the minimum score on a measure that 
balances complexity with fit – Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) – is recommended 
to select the best model. 
3.4.2. Extrapolation (analysis outside the observed range) 
                                                          
**
 An exception is that the multi stage model is the preferred approach to analysing cancer bioassay data, 
which is a relatively flexible modelling framework.  
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3.4.2.1. Context and Heuristics 
Extrapolation involves the construction of new data points, and, in our context, refers to 
analysis in the low-dose region. It is the most significant stage of the modelling process, as 
the low-dose region is relevant to real-world human exposure levels and is thus the basis for 
regulatory decisions. Perhaps the most controversial heuristics are those guiding the 
selection of model structure at low doses: (44)  
 If a chemical is carcinogenic, then a linear non-threshold dose-response model is 
adopted. The exception to this rule is cases where a) the chemical’s mode-of-action 
is established and b) that mode of action is thought to be non-linear at low doses 
(e.g. cytotoxicity);  
 If a chemical is non-carcinogenic, then a threshold dose-response model is applied 
(i.e. below a certain exposure, no response is expected). 
The non-threshold linearity assumption for carcinogens originated in radiation biology, and 
– although there are of course significant differences in how the two types of exposure are 
absorbed by and interact with organisms – was later mapped across to chemicals regulation. 
(51) This was on the grounds that it was both theoretically plausible – the idea being that 
even a single “molecular event” can initiate malignant or neoplastic cell transformation, and 
so might lead to cancer – and likely to be health protective. (51) By contrast, the presumption 
of a threshold for non-carcinogens follows the idea that below a certain dose, clearance 
pathways, cellular defences, and repair processes can minimize damage and thus render 
exposure practically negligible. (44) However, these rules have been critiqued for retaining a 
certain ambiguity about when they can be overturned, which we return to later.  
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The above, then, are rules for selecting the fundamental assumptions or basic structures of 
the models to be adopted. Let us now turn to rules for applying those model structures to 
the data. In linear extrapolation, the goal of the modelling exercise is to derive the slope of 
the dose-response curve, as this (combined with exposure) is the basis for the subsequent 
risk estimate. The relevant heuristic is as follows:   
 The slope is derived by simply drawing a straight line from the point of departure 
(POD) to the intersect of the two axes, correcting for background.†† 
By contrast, for threshold models, the goal is to derive a “safe” level of human exposure (i.e. 
the threshold for humans, known as the reference dose or reference concentration). This is 
done through applying a series of uncertainty and adjustment factors (conventionally a 
value of 10 is used for each, where applicable) to the POD to account for: (52) 
 Inter-species variability; 
 Variations in susceptibility within the human population; 
 The difference in sensitivity between chronic and sub-chronic toxicity studies (in the 
case where sub-chronic studies are the basis for deriving a threshold for a chronic 
effect); 
 The difference between LOAEL and NOAEL (if LOAEL is used as the POD); and 
 Gaps or uncertainties in the toxicity database. 
These “safety factors” are essentially back-of-the-envelope style heuristics designed to 
accommodate the various forms of uncertainty – both in terms of variability and ignorance – 
and adjustments required to extrapolate from the findings of a specific laboratory protocol 
                                                          
††
 Model-based approaches to low dose extrapolation may also be performed (e.g. in biologically based dose 
response modelling), but theoretical and empirical limitations generally preclude this. 
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to derive results meaningful for human populations. A slightly more refined approach is the 
use of chemical-specific adjustment factors, where, for example, empirical data on 
interspecies differences in the uptake or metabolism of a chemical are used to depart from 
the conventional value of 10. (53) 
3.4.3. Analysis 
There exist a rich range of modelling heuristics, from those selecting what is to be modelled 
in the first instance (e.g. which endpoint, which species), to those adjusting or laundering 
the raw data to make it fit-for-purpose (e.g. adjusting measures of exposure), and even 
those selecting the fundamental assumptions (e.g. threshold vs. non-threshold) and specific 
functional form of the model to be applied. Of course rules being rules, they inevitably will 
have their exceptions, yet one major issue is the lack of clarity about what sort of evidence, 
and how much, is required to depart from them. This has led to several instances when the 
EPA has been reluctant to depart from them their heuristics even in the face of substantial 
contradictory empirical evidence. For example, the agency retained the default linear 
approach to low dose extrapolation in its risk assessment of dioxin, despite clear evidence 
suggesting that the substance promoted cancer via receptor-mediated pathways that are by 
nature non-linear. (53) This not only led to a skewed estimate of risk, but also understated 
uncertainty, as the assessment failed to explore how departing from this particular default 
would have influenced the analysis outcomes. The very same problem – a lack of clarity on 
what constitutes “sufficient showing” for departures – is found with the default safety 
factors. (54) And again, this ambiguity has led EPA risk assessors to rigidly adhere to the 
default values in cases, such as with dioxin and formaldehyde, where a wealth of data 
seems to justify departing from them and using chemical-specific adjustment factors. (54)  
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A second common thread is the tension between adopting heuristics that have a reasonable 
theoretical and empirical basis on the one hand, and the desire to have rules that are health 
protective on the other. This is a conflict lying at the heart of many debates over method 
and policy in risk regulation – when does it make sense to attempt to regulate on the basis 
of “best” estimates of risk (e.g. mean, or median) vs. more precautionary approaches? Thus, 
critical analyses of these modelling rules have focused not simply on their accuracy or 
generality, (e.g. 46, 48) but more broadly on their perceived tendency to exaggerate risk – 
particularly when compounded. (e.g. 55) This has led the EPA to articulate (in different levels 
of detail) the circumstances or evidence that might justify departures from some rules 
generally perceived to be precautionary (e.g. specifying the factors that may justify using 
the species that most resembles humans as the basis for dose-response modelling, rather 
than the “critical effect”), and to establish one other reform that holds particular conceptual 
interest: (52) 
 A safeguard against the excessive compounding of uncertainty and adjustment 
factors has been established – specifically, they must not combine beyond a value of 
10,000 in deriving the safe level of human exposure.¶ 
The above has some parallels with Pearl’s notion of recovery schemes, which traditionally 
serves as an “escape valve” from the rigid application of rules when they are perceived to 
lead in unhelpful or perverse directions. However, in the above case, the logic is that a 
compounding of factors to 10,000 and beyond – whilst sometimes required by a strict 
interpretation of the rules – would lead to significant exaggerations of the “true” risk posed 
by the chemical. And so the distinction is that departures from the rules are justified out of 
                                                          
¶
 The safeguard of 10,000 applies to oral doses; a safeguard of 3,000 is applied to inhaled doses. 
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concern for the interaction of rules, rather than a concern with rules operating in isolation. 
This is distinct from the usual scope restrictions and “recovery schemes” that come with 
heuristics, and suggests the importance of analysing heuristics as systems or chains of rules, 
rather than merely as independent objects. (c.f. 56) 
Also worth reflecting on is the distinction between the EPA’s mix of factors-based guidance 
and heuristics for selecting and applying models for interpolation of the dose-response data, 
compared to the rather more prescriptive and rule-bound approach to extrapolation. In 
extrapolation, heuristics set out the default model structures to be adopted, and set out in 
detail the particular rules to be followed in implementing those models. In contrast, in 
interpolation, model implementation is factors-based rather than rule-bound. And model 
selection is a mixture of clear rules and informal tests (e.g. “eyeballing”). And the rules focus 
on the processes by which models should be selected (e.g. measures of goodness of fit and 
AIC), rather than prescribing particular outcomes (i.e. default models). At first glance this 
contrast appears surprising or perhaps even incoherent, as the low-dose region is the very 
area in which theories are most contentious and data largely lacking. Yet an explanation 
comes to light when we consider that alternative plausible approaches to low dose 
extrapolation lead to risk estimates that may differ by several orders of magnitude. (57) In 
other words, the analysis outcomes are particularly sensitive to the choices made during 
extrapolation, rather than interpolation. The assumption and model-laden nature of 
extrapolation, and the extent to which it determines outcomes, has long been recognised. 
And given the general lack of scientific agreement over the most appropriate assumptions, it 
historically fed concerns about both inconsistency in risk assessment, and that outcomes 
may even be tailored to meet policy objectives. (54)  And so the introduction of ruleness in 
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this case appears to represent not so much an attempt to codify or formalise existing (albeit 
provisional) bodies of knowledge, nor simply a desire to err on the side of precaution, but 
rather an attempt to narrow or constrain the inferences open to risk assessors, and thus 
enforce a degree of consistency, transparency, and predictability in both process and 
outcomes. Critics argue that this pursuit of consistency has brought with it blindspots, such 
as the neglect or marginalisation of low-dose phenomena that do not cohere with the 
extrapolation rules (e.g. hormetic responses characterised by low-dose stimulation and 
high-dose inhibition, (58) and postulated mechanisms of endocrine disruption where 
conventional dose-response assumptions are held to be invalid (59)). The claim here is not 
just that rules have exceptions, but that they can become entrenched in ways that make it 
difficult to displace or circumvent them in practice. For example, as a consequence of the 
very existence of the low-dose extrapolation rules – and the way that they shape the 
underlying paradigms of toxicity testing – there is rarely case-specific evidence available to 
question or indeed support their validity (i.e. empirical data within the low-dose region is 
simply not part of conventional test requirements). On this reading, rules can shape 
practices in the real world in ways that make it less likely for them to be challenged. 
4. STUDY II: PROBLEMS WITH RULES IN PRACTICE 
The foregoing analysis has is in a sense been largely theoretical, focussed more on the 
content, structural features, strengths and potential problems of the heuristics of risk 
assessment, rather than on how they are interpreted and applied in concrete settings. We 
now turn to make the case that some of those structural features and potential limitations 
play out in real-world settings in interesting and important ways, and that this is not an 
issue restricted to industrial chemicals regulation. We do so by analysing six cases of judicial 
28 
 
review of regulatory risk assessments in the United States, in policy domains ranging from 
air pollution, to water quality standards, to waste management. We identified these cases 
through entering various search strings intended to reflect or relate to our previously 
discussed expert heuristics (e.g. “risk assessment” AND “default assumptions;” “risk 
assessment” AND “safety factors”), and scrutinizing the results for relevance. The idea was 
not to recover a comprehensive listing of all such disputes, but rather to identify those cases 
which had turned in significant measure on the regulatory agency’s application or 
interpretation of heuristics.  
The particular disputes recovered focussed on such things as the application of default 
model structures, on the use and neglect of safety factors, and on the reasoning behind 
departing from hierarchies of evidence (Table 1). They reveal instances of the unthinking 
reliance on rules, such as when an emission standard for an air pollutant was based on a 
default model that assumed the substance to be a gas, when in fact it was known to be a 
solid at the relevant temperatures. They highlight examples of the dubious interpretation of 
rules, such as where the EPA relied on ad hoc justifications to retain the default linearity 
assumption in modelling the risk of a carcinogen, despite having earlier concluded that it 
followed a nonlinear mode of action (cytotoxic rather than genotoxic). They show instances 
of unreasoned departures from rules, such as where the EPA and OSHA failed to justify 
deviating from safety factors designed to account for sensitive populations, which again 
highlights the dangers of not clarifying what constitutes “sufficient showing” for departures. 
And they point towards the interpretive flexibility associated with linguistically defined 
rather than mathematical rules, such as in the dispute over whether a particular toxicology 
experiment was unethically conducted and so should not be relied on.  Taken as a whole, 
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the cases show that heuristics play important roles in risk assessment across various policy 
domains, that they are sometimes applied or interpreted in problematic and contested 
ways, and that authoritative actors (e.g. courts) take these issues seriously. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Psychological research has cast doubt on the idea that laypeople use formal logic or 
statistical approaches to reason about risk issues, suggesting instead that they rely on 
simple and error-prone rules of thumb. Many scholars have drawn a sharp-distinction 
between this heuristic-reasoning and the rigour and reliability of formal risk assessment, 
and by extension called for relatively technocratic approaches to risk regulation as a way of 
ensuring that policies conform to rational ideals. (1, 4, 7-8, 10-13) Yet as we have seen here, 
formal risk assessment is structured and pervaded by its own set of heuristics. As a 
preliminary typology, we distinguished between classification rules that inform priority 
setting and test strategies; gatekeeping heuristics that filter problematic studies away from 
the risk assessment process; rules that structure and guide causal inference; and heuristics 
for model selection and application. Some of these rules lay claim to empirical or theoretical 
justifications, whilst others are more back-of-the-envelope style estimations, and still more 
serve policy goals beyond that of simply codifying knowledge. This is not to imply an 
equivalence between lay and expert risk assessment. Instead, we have tried to suggest that 
significant aspects of risk assessment can be represented as heuristics, and to use this 
insight to work towards a useful analytical framework for characterising the process. 
Put another way, our basic argument is that by analysing the rules of risk assessment qua 
rules, we generate important insights about the nature, strengths, and limits of the prior art, 
and insights that offer practical ways of improving it. We suggest that the heuristics of risk 
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assessment are not just an unruly collection of tools. When viewed as an approach to 
governing risk assessment, heuristics serve to close down or constrain interpretive 
possibilities, thus conferring a modicum of stability, consistency, and transparency upon a 
process that might otherwise be (seen as) highly sensitive to the choices of individual 
analysts. They can be understood as a way of authenticating or formalising risk assessment 
as a scientific practice, (60, 61) representing as they do a series of rules for bounding 
problems, collecting data, and making sense out of it (i.e. a methodology). There are, of 
course, substantive critiques of heuristics qua rules, including that they generate systematic 
error, may create a veneer of consistency by masking uncertainties, can be manipulated for 
strategic purposes, and have a tendency to become entrenched. These critiques can be 
partially offset by ensuring that the scope conditions of rules are specified, that the nature 
and extent of evidence required to justify a departure from them are made clear, that 
programs exist to periodically re-evaluate the empirical and theoretical support of particular 
heuristics, that recovery schemes are in place to correct for when they go awry, and that 
“escape valves” are in place to guard against perverse outcomes stemming from the 
interaction of rules. The critical idea here is that heuristics are not problematic per se, but 
they can become so when we treat them as laws by neglecting their rough and contingent 
nature. This principle may sound almost self-evident, but as our empirical evidence shows, 
at times it is more honoured in the breach than the observance. However, regardless of 
whether these ideals are met in practice, rule-based reasoning has certain intrinsic 
characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses, and tensions remain between the virtues served 
by relying on rules compared with those furthered by alternative species of reasoning (e.g. 
factors-based judgments).  
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A concern with the rules of risk assessment raises questions for future research. One 
involves developing a set of criteria and methods for evaluating individual heuristics, and 
this seems in principle possible to do within a formal decision theoretic framework. (e.g. 62) 
Another relates to how heuristics function in the wild (c.f. 63) – how are they selected, 
interpreted, applied or neglected in practice? We have taken tentative steps in this 
direction, but more systematic work could follow. And what rules might exist in the real-
world of risk assessment, but not on the books? A complicating issue is that expert 
heuristics are often not directly accessible or known to the expert themselves, and require 
dedicated approaches to knowledge elicitation. (64) Another avenue is the question of 
whether and why there are significant differences in the degree of ruleness, and in the 
particular rules relied upon, across regimes and jurisdictions? And other stages of the 
regulatory process – such as economic analysis and the decision-making process itself – are 
ripe for exploration. Finally, there is the more general normative issue of when or in what 
contexts it makes sense to rely on heuristics, versus alternative species of reasoning (e.g. 
factors based judgments, complex algorithms, probabilistic approaches, unconstrained 
discretion, etc.)? (63) In the meantime, our present analysis has revealed the pervasive 
influence of heuristics in structuring formal risk assessment, and cast light on the 
significance of this for understanding and designing risk regulation regimes. 
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Case Description Comments 
Chemical 
Manufacturers 
Association vs. EPA 
(1994), United States 
Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia 
Circuit.  
28 F.3d 1259 
EPA’s rule designating Methylene diphenyl diisocyanate a high risk air pollutant 
was challenged on various grounds. One was that the emission standard was 
based on the agency’s default model, which assumed the substance would be 
emitted as a gas and disperse as such, when in fact it is solid at the (most) relevant 
temperatures, has a low vapour point, and typically disperses as an aerosol. The 
decision was overturned as the default, generic model “bore no rational 
relationship” to the air pollutant in this case. 
The court acknowledged trade-off between accuracy and 
efficiency in risk assessment, but critiqued the EPA for rigid, 
unthinking adherence to default procedures for model 
selection (heuristics) when faced with overwhelming 
evidence that they were unsound in a particular instance. 
Leather Industries of 
America, Inc. et al. 
vs. EPA (1994), 
United States Court 
of Appeals, District 
of Columbia Circuit.  
40 F.3d 392 
Various petitioners challenged EPA’s decisions on sludge sewage disposal. The 
court critiqued the agency’s reliance on default, conservative assumptions about 
the use and application of heat-dried sludge, when it had specific, empirical data 
on these variables that were of quite a different order. Also critiqued the agency’s 
use of highly conservative exposure assumptions (high child exposure model), 
when in fact a high proportion of sewage sludge application is done at sites with 
limited potential for public (and child) contact. Key elements of the ruling were 
overturned by the court. 
Critique once more focussed on blanket reliance on 
conservative modelling assumptions and practices when, 
crucially, there was empirical data available that suggested 
them to be problematic. A central concern of the court was 
the lack of justification or explanation given by the agency 
for relying on heuristics that seemed, on face value, to be 
unreasonable. 
International Union 
et al. vs. OSHA 
(1994), United States 
Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia 
Circuit.  
878 F.2d 389 
Several unions challenged OSHA’s emission standards on formaldehyde in the 
workplace as insufficiently stringent. Central issue was whether the agency 
adequately explained its reasons for departing from the default assumption of 
linearity at low doses for the carcinogen (the linearity heuristic). The rule was 
remanded. 
Court held that the agency had not given a properly 
reasoned basis for departing from the heuristic, and so 
overturned the rule. As a subsidiary issue, court found no 
issue with the agency departing from another default rule – 
when they favoured animal studies rather than 
epidemiological data in standard setting – on the grounds 
that this was a reasoned departure from the rule. For 
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 example, they cited difficulties in getting precise exposure 
data, and controlling for possible confounders, etc.  
Chlorine Chemistry 
Council, et al. vs. EPA 
(2000), United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the District of 
Columbia Circuit  
206 F.3d 1286 
Industry groups challenged EPA for retaining a maximum contaminant level goal 
(MCLG) of zero for chloroform. The level had originally been set based on the 
assumption of linearity in the low dose range (the default heuristic for 
carcinogens), combined with statutory mandate to set MCLG at level where no 
known or anticipated adverse effects occur. The groups challenged EPA for failing 
to revise the MCLG despite having more recently concluded that the substance 
exhibited a nonlinear mode of carcinogenic action (cytotoxic rather than genotoxic 
mode of action). EPA deployed various ad hoc arguments for why they had not 
revised the standard (e.g. that it was waiting for deliberations with its advisory 
board before departing from a long held policy). Court sided with the petitioners. 
EPA’s decision was overturned on the grounds that it had 
failed to adhere to one of its own rules of risk assessment. 
That is, the agency’s own guidelines state that when 
“adequate data on mode of action show that linearity is not 
the most reasonable working judgment and provide 
sufficient evidence to support a nonlinear mode of action," 
the default (heuristic) assumption of linearity should be 
departed from. 
Northwest Coalition 
et al. vs. EPA (2008), 
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit 
F.3d 1043, 1052 
Environmental groups challenged EPA’s tolerances for seven pesticides. 
In particular, they challenged EPA’s deviation from default safety factors (the back 
of the envelope heuristics) designed to be protective of infants and children for 
acetamiprid, mepiquat, and pymetrozine. The governing statute states that the 
EPA is allowed to “use a different margin of safety for the pesticide chemical 
residue only if, on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe for infants 
and children.” However, the court found that the EPA had not clearly argued or 
articulated the link between the underlying toxicological evidence, and the (non-
default) safety factors that were ultimately adopted. The decision was remanded 
on this basis. 
The dispute, as the court saw it, turned on whether the 
EPA’s evidence constituted “reliable data” for inferring that 
the lower margins of safety would be sufficiently 
protective. The agency had explicitly stated its reasoning 
behind deviating from (and lowering) its default safety 
factors when it set the tolerances (e.g. claiming data 
showed no evidence of greater sensitivity to the young, nor 
of abnormalities in development of foetal nervous system).  
However, the court found this inadequate, holding that the 
particular deviations – e.g. from a safety factor of 10 to one 
of 3 for pymetrozine – seemed chosen arbitrarily. This 
perhaps seems a rather high standard of evidence to 
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demand – safety factors are by their nature rather 
arbitrarily chosen. However, what is interesting is that the 
court emphasised that what constitutes “reliable data,” in 
other words, what constitutes reasonable grounds for 
departing from the default rules, is not explicitly defined in 
the relevant statute. This is the common problem of 
neglecting to define the nature and extent of evidence that 
constitutes “sufficient showing” to depart from heuristics.   
National Resources 
Defense Council 
(NRDC) vs. EPA 
(2011), 
United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit 
658 F.3d 200 
NRDC challenged EPA’s dichlorvos risk assessment on several grounds. The risk 
assessment itself had various components, with some relying on a study of human 
subjects (the “Gledhill study”), and some relying on animal toxicology studies. 
NRDC claimed that the agency’s departure from the presumptive tenfold 
children’s safety factor (the heuristic) was unsound. The court agreed in part, 
finding that in some components of the risk assessment the agency had failed to 
explicitly justify this departure. These portions of the risk assessment were 
vacated. By contrast, in the portions of the risk assessment that relied on animal 
studies, the EPA provided explicit reasons for departing from the default (e.g. “no 
evidence for increased susceptibility of the rat and rabbit offspring to prenatal or 
postnatal exposure to dichlorvos”). These portions were upheld. 
Another grounds for NRDC’s challenge was that the EPA’s reliance on the Gledhill 
study violated its own gatekeeping heuristic. The rule, which is restricted to 
pesticides regulation, forbids the EPA (and FDA) from relying on data from 
research on human subjects initiated prior to April 7, 2006 in cases where there is 
“clear and convincing evidence that the research was either: 
Once more, (portions of) a risk assessment were overturned 
in court due to unreasoned departures from heuristics. 
However, unreasoned here should be interpreted in the 
literal sense of a failure to provide explicit justifications, 
rather than necessarily being unwise.   
The (unresolved) dispute over the gatekeeping rule is 
interesting in that it highlights the interpretive flexibility 
contained within linguistically formulated (rather than 
mathematical) rules. 
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[1] fundamentally unethical (e.g., the research was intended to seriously harm 
participants or failed to obtain informed consent), or 
[2] significantly deficient relative to the ethical standards prevailing at the time the 
research was conducted.” 
This dispute turned on whether the human subjects could be considered to have 
given their informed consent. For example, in parts of the consent forms the 
pesticide was referred to as a drug. However, the EPA countered that its 
independent experts found the consent forms “clearly advised subjects that this 
was a study involving consuming an insecticide.” Court declined to resolve this 
dispute. 
Table 1: Data showing contested or problematic applications of heuristics in agency decision making, drawn from judicial reviews. 
 
